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Abstract
Solutions for agreement problems in distributed sys
tems can generally be divided into two classes authen
ticated protocols and nonauthenticated protocols Au
thenticated protocols make use of authenticated mes
sages ie the messages can be signed in a way that a
signed message can be assigned unambiguously to the
signer Few has been said about how to achieve this
kind of authentication in some settings this is im
possible without a trusted dealer or other mechanisms
outside the system
In this paper we introduce and investigate a weaker
kind of authentication local authentication It can
be achieved within a distributed system with an arbi
trary number of arbitrary faults We then show that
Failure Discovery a problem introduced by Hadzilacos
and Halpern can be solved with authenticated protocols
even if only local authentication is available Since au
thenticated protocols for this problem have linear mes
sage complexity as opposed to quadratic complexity
in the nonauthenticated case the eort of establish
ing local authentication once results in a substantial
reduction of messages in subsequent failurediscovery
protocols
  Introduction
A fundamental problem in distributed systems is to
reach agreement despite the presence of failing nodes
This problem was introduced as Byzantine Agreement
by Lamport Shostak and Pease  and has since
been discussed to a considerable extent Byzantine
Agreement requires all correct nodes in the system to
agree on the same value which must be the value of
a distinguished sender if the sender is correct One
of the many variations of this problem is the Fail
ure Discovery problem introduced by Hadzilacos and
Halpern 	 Failure Discovery requires the nodes to
reach Byzantine Agreement provided no node discov

ers that a failure occurred We will focus on this prob

lem in our paper
Solutions for agreement problems can be divided
into two classes authenticated protocols and non

authenticated protocols In authenticated protocols
it is assumed that each receiver of a signed message
can unambiguously identify the signer This assump

tion generally allows better solutions eg with regard
to the maximum number of tolerated faulty nodes or
the amount of data exchanged Few has been said in
the past about how authentication can be established
in a fault
prone system
To reach the required common knowledge about
how to identify the signatures of the respective nodes
known as key distribution one can either use non

authenticated agreement protocols which may not
work because of too many faulty nodes or assume
some reliable key server or key server group which
contradicts the underlying model of computation
In this paper we introduce an incomplete authenti

cation technique called local authentication which can
be established in a system with an arbitrary number of
arbitrarily faulty nodes Roughly speaking each node
distributes the verication information for its signa

ture by itself it is not necessary that all nodes reach
agreement on this information
We then show that solutions for the problem of
Failure Discovery which use authentication still work
when merely local authentication is available That
means that one can use authenticated protocols in an
non
authenticated environment after establishing lo

cal authentication thus reducing the overall message
complexity substantially
 Model of computation
In this section we describe the model of computa

tion which has become the standard model for agree

ment protocols Our world consists of a fully in

terconnected network with n nodes processors and
n   n  	 bidirectional communication links The
network has the following properties
N Messages are transmitted reliably in bounded
time
N	 A receiver of a message can identify its immediate
sender
The nodes communicate in successive rounds In each
round a node may send messages to other nodes and
receives all messages sent to it in the current round
A sequence of rounds in a protocol is called a run
A view of a node in round i of run r is the sequence
of sets of messages it has received in each round of
the run r up to round i The actions a node takes in
the next round depend solely on its current view A
run is called failurefree if no node deviates from the
given protocol If a nodes view of a run diers from
its views of all failure
free runs it discovers a failure
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We make no assumptions about the type of failures
that occur If a node is faulty it may behave in an
arbitrary manner This type of behaviour is usually
referred to as byzantine fault
Furthermore we assume the existence of a signa

ture scheme with the following properties
S A node can produce a signed message fmg
S
if and
only if it knows the secret key S and the message
m
S	 For each secret key S
i
there exists a public
test predicate T
i
with the property T
i
fmg
S
 
true S  S
i

S The secret key S
i
cannot be extracted from a
signed message fmg
S
i
andor the test predicate
T
i

Examples for signature schemes which fulll these
properties with a suciently high probability are DSA
and RSA  
Note that we do not make any assumptions about
the authenticity of the distribution of the test predi

cates amongst the nodes This point is dierent from
the usual assumptions when signature schemes are in

volved
 Local authentication
In this section we introduce a new mechanism
for optimizing failure discovery local authentication
This mechanism should ll the gap between non

authenticated protocols and authenticated protocols
Authenticated protocols require public keys to be
distributed authentically amongst the nodes ie the
nodes have consistent information on how to check
signed messages This state can be reached either by
using an agreement protocol for each public key or
by relying on some kind of trusted dealer or group
of dealers which never fails The rst method may
not be feasible because of an insucient number of
correct nodes the second introduces problems by the
requirement of certain nodes to be of higher reliability
When using local authentication each node dis

tributes its public key amongst the other nodes by
itself This leads to a limited kind of authentication
While each node has the same public key for a cor

rect node the public keys for faulty nodes may dier
However we give a distribution protocol which guar

antees that a node can distribute only public keys for
which it has the appropriate private key That means
that no faulty node can claim a public key of a correct
node for itself We will show that protocols for Fail

ure Discovery which are designed for global authen

tication can safely be used with local authentication
With this approach we can make use of the advan

tages of authenticated protocols without the need to
assume global authentication
 The key distribution protocol
Fig  shows the distribution protocol which estab

lishes locally authentic public keys First each node
P
i
selects a pair of keys S
i
and T
i
 One the secret key
S
i
 is used to sign messages the other one the public
key T
i
 is used to verify the signatures For notational
reasons we suppose that the public key is cast into
a test predicate which checks whether a message was
signed with the corresponding secret key Then each
node sends its test predicate to all the other nodes
On reception of a test predicate a node starts a
challenge
response protocol to see whether the sender
actually has access to the appropriate secret key It
sends a message with a random number r
j
together
with the names of both nodes to the other node It
accepts the test predicate if and only if the message
comes back with a correct signature The challenged
node on the other hand signs the challenge if and
only if it contained both its own name and that of the
challenger
The message complexity of the protocol is   n  n
 as each node needs three messages to convince any
other node of its test predicate It takes  rounds of
communication
 General properties
Signatures have the purpose to allow the assign

ment of a message to a unique signer We state this
fact in the following denition
Denition  Assignment A node assigns a
message fmg
S
to a node P
i
 if it has accepted T
i
as
belonging to P
i
and T
i
fmg
S
  true
In the case of local authentication a node accepts
a test predicate during the key distribution protocol
Fig  When global authentication is used accep

tance of a test predicate must be reached by other
means eg by communication with a perfectly reli

able node
Authentication has the purpose to let the nodes
make the assignments in a correct and consistent man

ner We will compare local and global authentication
with respect to their assignment properties These are
the properties of global authentication
G If a correct node assigns a signed message to a
correct node P  then P has signed the message
G	 A message signed by a correct node P is assigned
to P by all correct nodes
G Each correct node assigns a signed message to the
same node
Property G captures the case where the signer and
the owner of a signature are faulty When some
faulty node gives its secret key to some other faulty
node which uses this key to sign its messages the
signed messages are not assigned to the real signer
But still all correct recipients of the signed message as

sign it to the same node Local authentication shares
properties G and G	 as shown in the following
theorem
Theorem 	 After the key distribution protocol
G and G hold
Protocol for each node P
i

Generate a secret key S
i
and an appropriate test predicate T
i
send T
i
to all other nodes
for each received T
j

select a random number r
j
send fP
i
 P
j
 r
j
g to P
j
for each received fP
j
 P
i
 rg from P
j

send fP
j
 P
i
 rg
S
i
to P
j
for each received fP
i
 P
j
 rg
S
j
from P
j

if T
j
fP
i
 P
j
 rg
S
j
  true and r  r
j
accept T
j
as belonging to P
j
Figure  Key Distribution Protocol
Proof
 G If a message fmg
S
is assigned to P by a
correct node P has shown that it knows S in the
key distribution protocol Since S is not sent in
any step of the distribution protocol P is correct
and S and S hold P must have signed the
message
	 G	 The proof is by contradiction Assume a
correct node P
i
does not assign a message fmg
S
j
signed by a correct node P
j
to the signer Two
things could have happened
a P
i
does not recognize the signature or
b P
i
assigns the message to another node P
k

In case a P
j
did not send its T
j
to P
i
or it did not
correctly answer the challenge from P
i
 Hence P
j
would be faulty In case b P
i
must have received
a message fP
i
 P
k
 rg
S
j
from P
k
 Hence either P
k
must know the secret key S
j
or P
j
has signed
the message instead In both cases P
j
would be
faulty
 
Unfortunately property G does not hold for local
authentication Cooperating faulty nodes may well
distribute their test predicates in a mixed manner
such that two correct nodes assign a message to dier

ent faulty nodes Another possibility is that a faulty
node distributes dierent test predicates to the cor

rect nodes This leads to classes of nodes such that
the faulty node can select the class of nodes which can
assign the message at all How this problem can be
overcome in the context of failure discovery is shown
in the next section
 Failure discovery properties
In this section we show that local authentication
can be used to solve the Failure Discovery problem
introduced by Hadzilacos and Halpern 	 eciently
The problem is to devise an algorithm that will en

sure the following properties in the presence of up to
t faulty nodes
F Weak Termination Each correct node eventu

ally either chooses a decision value or discovers a
failure
F	 Weak Agreement If no correct node discov

ers a failure then no two correct nodes choose
dierent decision values
F Weak Validity If no correct process discovers a
failure and the sender is correct then no correct
node chooses a value dierent from the senders
initial value
If no failure is discovered this is essentially Byzan

tine Agreement as dened in  Note that it is not
necessary that a failure discovering node can identify
the faulty node it has merely to notice the existence
of a failure
Hadzilacos and Halpern show that a protocol for
Failure Discovery can be extended under certain con

ditions to a protocol for Byzantine Agreement The
interesting point is that the extended protocol requires
in its failure
free runs the same number of messages
as the underlying Failure Discovery protocol
The authors point out that Failure Discovery can
be solved with On
 
 messages without authentica

tion and with On messages if global authentication
is available We will show that in the context of Fail

ure Discovery local authentication has the same prop

erties as global authentication So once local authen

tication is established one can run arbitrarily many
Failure Discovery protocols with low message com

plexity We start by showing that condition F is
not violated by the use of local authentication
Lemma  If F is fullled by a protocol under
global authentication it is fullled by the same protocol
under local authentication
Proof The introduction of local authentication does
not change the failure
free runs of the protocol If a
node has the view of a failure
free run it hence will
eventually decide for a value As soon as its view is
dierent it discovers a failure  
Conditions F	 and F are fullled trivially if a
correct node discovers a failure So if we can guaran

tee that some node discovers a failure as soon as the
properties of global authentication are violated we are
done Of course the protocol still has to ensure that
failures which lead to incorrect agreement and are not
related to the use of local signatures are discovered
Protocol for P


send value fvg
S
 
to P
 
Protocol for P
i
	  i  t
receive m  fS
i  
    S

 fvg
S
 
  g
S
i  
from P
i 
check the signatures of the message and the submessages
if negative then discover failure and stop
else accept v and send fS
i 
 mg
S
i
to P
i
Protocol for P
t

receive m  fS
t 
   S

 fvg
S
 
  g
S
t
from P
t
check the signatures of the message and the submessages
if negative then discover failure and stop
else accept v and send fS
t
 mg
S
t 
to P
t 
to P
n
Protocol for P
t
 	 to P
n

receive m  fS
t
   S

 fvg
S
 
  g
S
t 
from P
t
check the signatures of the message and the submessages
if negative then discover failure
else accept v
Figure 	 Failure Discovery Protocol
Since properties G and G	 have been shown to
be the same for both types of authentication Theorem
	 all that is left to show is that G holds if no
failure is discovered To show that we rst have a
closer look at chain signatures Chain signatures are
a common mechanism in authenticated protocols A
message with a chain signature is a message which has
been signed by a sequence of nodes each one signing
the signed message of its predecessor
For our purposes we require that a message which
has been signed before is always signed together with
the name of the node it is assigned to Hence a mes

sage with chain signature has the following structure
fP
n 
 f  P
 
 fP

 fmg
S
 
g
S

  g
S
n  
g
S
n

If a message fP
 
 fP

 fmg
S
 
g
S

g
S

is assigned to P


it can be interpreted as P

said that P
 
said that P

said m We will call the messages which are contained
within a message submessages The submessages in
the above example are fP

 fmg
S
 
g
S

 fmg
S
 
and m
The intent of this kind of signature is to make ev

eryone agree on who said what to whom Whereas
this aim is reached by global authentication it is
not reached by local authentication Here a message
signed by a faulty node may be assigned to dierent
faulty nodes or to no node at all depending on the
behaviour of the signer in the key distribution proto

col Fortunately such a misbehaviour of a faulty node
can at least be discovered under local authentication
as will be shown in theorem 
We rst observe the following If in the above ex

ample a correct node not only assigns the complete
message to P

but also the submessages to the respec

tive given nodes it knows that it has made the same
assignments as its correct predecessors Furthermore
since the immediate sender of a message is known N
and all messages are signed it knows that all other re

cipients of that message as submessage or not will
assign it to P

or discover a failure This observation
is stated in the following theorem
Theorem 
 After the key distribution protocol
Fig  the following holds All correct nodes assign
a submessage to the same node or at least one of
them discovers a failure
Proof Assignment to the last signer Since all mes

sages have to be signed the last signature must stem
from the immediate sender of the message This
sender is recognizable for all nodes N If a node
assigns the message to a dierent node it discovers a
failure
Assignment to the signers of submessages If a cor

rect node does not assign a submessage to the node
stated before the message it discovers a failure Oth

erwise it assigns the submessage to the same node as
the other nodes which do not discover a failure  
This shows that G to G hold for local authen

tication if no failure is discovered Hence a protocol
that fullls F to F with the assumption of global
authentication has the same failure discovery proper

ties when only local authentication is available
 Protocols
Fig 	 shows a simple failure discovery protocol for
an arbitrary value range taken from  The sender
P

 signs its value and sends it to P
 
 P
 
 in turn signs
the message and gives it to P

 This is iterated until
the message reaches P
t
with t denoting the number
of tolerated faulty nodes P
t
then signs the message
and disseminates it to the rest of the participants
This protocol works with the minimal number of
messages of n cf  Since all messages are signed
and the correctness of the protocol has been shown for
global authentication it can be applied under local
authentication
If the value range is known a priori and small com

pared to n solutions with fewer messages are possible
by assigning values to missing messages Protocols
of this type given in  fulll the conditions for the
application of local authentication too
In the same paper Hadzilacos and Halpern state
that non
authenticated protocols for arbitrary failures
need On   t messages with t denoting the number of
tolerated faulty nodes With a constant portion of
the nodes being faulty this makes On
 
 messages
Hence after executing the key distribution protocol
once On
 
 messages in  rounds we can reduce the
number of messages per protocol run from On
 
 to
On
 Summary
We have introduced and examined a new authen

tication assumption for agreement protocols This
local authentication can be established in a non

authenticated system without assumptions about the
number or behaviour of faulty nodes The necessary
key distribution protocol needs   n   n  messages
in  rounds
We have shown that Failure Discovery protocols
which were designed for completely authenticated en

vironments can also be applied under local authen

tication Since the message complexity of authenti

cated protocols On is much better than that of
non
authenticated protocols On
 
 this approach
gives a substantial message complexity gain in non

authenticated environments
Further research is necessary to investigate the use
of local authentication with other agreement proto

cols esp with Byzantine Agreement We conjecture
that the fundamental impossibility results for non

authenticated environments do not change with the
assumption of a signature scheme but we hope for im

provements in the area of average message complexity
and the parameters of weaker types of agreement eg
Degradable Agreement 
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